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Abstract
One of the hallmarks of the human species is our capacity for cumulative culture, in which beneficial knowledge and
technology is accumulated over successive generations. Yet previous analyses of cumulative cultural change have failed to
consider the possibility that as cultural complexity accumulates, it becomes increasingly costly for each new generation to
acquire from the previous generation. In principle this may result in an upper limit on the cultural complexity that can be
accumulated, at which point accumulated knowledge is so costly and time-consuming to acquire that further innovation is
not possible. In this paper I first review existing empirical analyses of the history of science and technology that support the
possibility that cultural acquisition costs may constrain cumulative cultural evolution. I then present macroscopic and
individual-based models of cumulative cultural evolution that explore the consequences of this assumption of variable
cultural acquisition costs, showing that making acquisition costs vary with cultural complexity causes the latter to reach an
upper limit above which no further innovation can occur. These models further explore the consequences of different
cultural transmission rules (directly biased, indirectly biased and unbiased transmission), population size, and cultural
innovations that themselves reduce innovation or acquisition costs.
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Introduction
One of the hallmarks of human culture is that it is cumulative.
Beneficial innovations are accumulated and combined over time
resulting in knowledge and technology that could not have been
invented by a single individual on their own [1,2]. While many
species exhibit culturally-transmitted regional traditions, from
chimpanzee tool using traditions [3] to birdsong dialects [4], only
humans appear able to accumulate cultural modifications in this
way [5]. This cumulative property is of huge significance: it
transforms culture into a second evolutionary inheritance system
[6–8] that is able to generate complex cultural adaptations, from
agricultural methods to medical knowledge to mass transportation
and communication technologies, that have allowed our species to
rapidly and successfully colonise virtually every terrestrial
environment on the planet [9,10]. Despite this significance, little
is known about the mechanisms and functions of cumulative
cultural evolution. Comparative studies with non-human primates
are beginning to delineate the cognitive mechanisms that underpin
the capacity for cumulative culture [5,11]. The present study
focuses on the functional aspects of cumulative cultural evolution
using analytical and simulation models, taking the capacity for
cumulative culture as a given. In particular, I focus here on a
previously unexplored constraint on cumulative cultural evolution:
the increasing cost of acquiring increasingly complex accumulated
knowledge. The following section reviews empirical studies of
cumulative culture that provide real-world dynamics against which
to compare model output, and empirical support for the claim that
cultural acquisition costs are increasing, before presenting
macroscopic (Model 1) and individual-based (Model 2) models of
constrained cumulative cultural evolution.
Empirical studies of cumulative culture
A well-documented example of cumulative cultural evolution is
seen in the growth of scientific knowledge [12]. Historians of
science have detailed how scientific knowledge has gradually
accumulated over successive generations of scientists, with each
new generation building on the advances of previous generations.
To paraphrase Isaac Newton, each new generation of scientists
can only see further by ‘‘standing on the shoulders of giants’’.
Mathematics, to which Newton himself contributed, is an
illustrative example of how scientific knowledge slowly accumu-
lates over successive generations and thousands of years. Only
after Babylonian scholars invented numerical notation and basic
arithmetic in around 2000 BC could Greek and Arab scholars
subsequently develop geometry and algebra respectively, which
then allowed Newton, Liebniz and other Europeans to invent
calculus and mechanics in the 17th century, through to present-day
mathematics [13,14].
Quantitative measures of the accumulation of scientific
knowledge can be obtained using metrics such as the number of
published papers in scientific journals, as well as more direct
indices such as the number of planets or species discovered or the
number of chemical substances created [12,15–17]. These
quantitative ‘‘scientometric’’ analyses have generally revealed an
exponential increase in scientific knowledge over time, such as that
illustrated in Figure 1A describing the number of published
abstracts in mathematics [17]. In a landmark scientometric
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publication, Price [12] showed that this exponential increase is
typical of many scientific fields and that the number of published
papers or abstracts generally doubles every 10–15 years. Yet while
Price [12] is commonly cited as having shown that scientific
knowledge increases exponentially, he also argued that this
exponential increase cannot continue indefinitely, and is likely to
be the initial part of a logistic growth curve with an eventual upper
limit, or saturation point, as shown in Figure 1B (‘‘all the apparently
exponential laws of growth must ultimately be logistic’’: ref [12],
p.30, see in particular Price’s Figure 5). Indeed, more recent analyses
of scientific accumulation have found evidence of knowledge
saturation in certain fields, such as in the discovery of new species
or planets [15]. A similar saturation has been observed for research
and development in industry [18]: despite increasing expenditure on
research and development during the latter part of the 20th century,
the number of patents produced per researcher has declined over the
same period. These recent trends necessitate a consideration of
potential constraints on cumulative cultural evolution.
One potential constraint is that the cost of acquiring the previous
generation’s accumulated cultural knowledge increases with the
magnitude or complexity of that knowledge. It seems reasonable to
assume that more-complex knowledge, such as knowledge of
quantum physics or the knowledge required to construct computers
and space shuttles, takes longer to acquire and has greater scope for
copying error than earlier knowledge, such as knowledge of
Newtonian physics or the knowledge required to construct stone
tools. Indeed, this would seem to be inherent in the very definition of
cumulative culture: if beneficial modifications are successively built
up over time, then people in later generations will, by definition,
have more accumulated knowledge to acquire than people in earlier
generations. Assuming that people have a limited, finite amount of
time in their lives to devote to acquiring previously accumulated
knowledge, there would theoretically come a point at which so
much has to be learned that there is no time remaining for
innovation, and accumulation will cease.
This prediction rests partly on the assumption that individual
learning recapitulates history, in other words, that people learn
during their lifetimes a sequence of concepts or skills that have
previously been accumulated historically. While this assumption
may not apply to all cultural domains, certain domains of scientific
knowledge do appear to show this recapitulation. Figure 2A shows
how present-day mathematics education during a single lifetime
recapitulates the order in which concepts were discovered in
human history, from basic counting and arithmetic (invented by
Babylonian scholars in approximately 2000 BC and learned at age
5–7 in the UK) to algebra (formulated most extensively by Arab
scholars such as Al-Khwarizmi and learned at age 11–14) to
calculus and mechanics (invented by Newton and others in the late
1680s and learned at age 16–18) to measure theory (developed at
the turn of the 20th century by Lebesgue, and learned at Masters
level at a minimum age of 22). Each stage is cumulative:
Newtonian mechanics could not have been invented (and cannot
be learned) until algebra had been invented (learned), which in
turn could not have been invented (learned) without knowledge of
basic counting and arithmetic. Figure 2A shows how mathematics
appears to be particularly subject to constraints due to increasing
complexity: UK Masters-level students do not learn anything that
was originally discovered after around 1900. Note, however, that
this historical/educational sequence omits suboptimal knowledge
that temporarily hindered historical accumulation, such as the
Babylonian base-60 system (rather than the currently used base-10
decimal system), which are not learned by present-day schoolchil-
dren. These suboptimal traits are considered in Model 2 below.
Direct evidence for the increasing cost of acquiring previous
knowledge and the consequent reduction in innovation is provided
in a recent analysis by Jones [19], who found an increase over the
last century in the mean age at which Nobel prize winners made
their prize-winning contribution, and the mean age at which
inventors produced inventions that warrant entry into almanacs of
significant technological advances. Figure 2B plots the maximum
likelihood functions derived from Jones’ [19] analysis of 294
scientists/inventors, showing that the peak probability of produc-
ing a significant scientific or technological advance increased from
around 32 years of age in 1900 to approximately 38 years of age in
2000. Further analyses showed that this increase is not due to a
general increase in lifespan, and can be directly attributed to an
increasingly long training period. This can be seen in Figure 2B:
while the post-40 decline in productivity is identical for the 1900
Figure 1. Exponential growth in scientific knowledge. (A) Empirically-derived exponential growth in mathematical knowledge as measured by
the number of published abstracts in mathematics from 1868–1965. The curve shown is a best-fit to data reported in May [17], regression equation
n= 1400e0.025(t-1880). (B) Price [12] argues that exponential increases in scientific output such as those documented by May (dashed line) are actually
the initial part of a logistic growth rate (solid line), eventually reaching a saturation point due to constraints on cumulative cultural evolution.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g001
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and 2000 curves, the age shift occurs at the beginning of life.
Indeed, the age at which Nobel prize winners received their PhDs
increased by a mean of 4 years over this 100-year period [19].
Note also from Figure 2B the decline in absolute productivity in
2000 compared to 1900, echoing the aforementioned decline in
patents per researcher that has occurred concurrently in industry
[18]. These empirical phenomena – an increase in the length of
training required to make a significant discovery and a decrease in
productivity – suggest that increasingly complex knowledge is
becoming increasingly more costly and time-consuming to
acquire, and is consequently constraining (or may constrain in
the future) further accumulation.
Previous analyses of cumulative cultural evolution [20–24] have
modelled the population-wide increase in some measure of
‘‘cultural complexity’’ as a function of variables such as population
size, innovation rate and transmission error. These models have
generated valuable insights such as that cumulative culture will be
influenced by population size, which can explain the loss of
cultural complexity in small populations [20] and gains in cultural
complexity as a result of increasing population size [22], or that
the exponential increase in cultural complexity reported above for
scientific knowledge can be explained in terms of positive feedback
between cultural transmission and creativity/innovation [21]. A
problematic assumption of these models, however, is that they do
not incorporate the aforementioned increasing costs of increas-
ingly-complex accumulated knowledge. The present study ex-
plores the consequences of this additional ‘‘variable cultural
acquisition cost’’ assumption for cumulative cultural evolution,
first by modifying an existing macroscopic, population-based
model (Model 1), and then by constructing a more detailed
individual-based model (Model 2). The latter individual-based
model allows the explicit tracking of individuals and their cultural
traits, providing a more direct simulation of cumulative cultural
evolution and its constraints.
Methods
Model 1 (Macroscopic Model)
Model 1 adds the assumption of variable cultural acquisition
costs to a previous model constructed by Henrich [20]. In this
model, a population is assumed to comprise N individuals each of
whom has some level of culturally transmitted skill denoted zi
(where subscript i identifies each individual, with i= 1, 2…N). This
culturally transmitted skill might be the complexity of the toolkit
that the individual is able to manufacture or use, or the complexity
of the scientific or ecological knowledge that the individual
possesses. Each member of each new generation of N individuals
acquires their zi value from the member of the previous generation
who has the highest z value, zh (i.e. directly biased transmission:
[8]). This transmission is inaccurate, reflecting real-life difficulties
of inference and communication [25,26]. The naı¨ve individual’s zi
value is drawn from a Gumbel distribution with mode zh - a and
dispersion b. The parameter a represents systematic transmission
error that degrades the skill, while b represents unsystematic noise
in transmission that occasionally may result in an improved skill
level relative to zh. Using the Price equation [27], Henrich [20]
showed that the between-generation change in mean z value
across in the entire population, Dz, is given by:
Dz~{azb(ez ln (N)) ð1Þ
where e is the Euler-Gamma constant (e<0.577). When this
change is positive (Dz.0) then culture is said to accumulate, which
occurs when systematic transmission error a is relatively low, when
random inference b is relatively high, and population size N is
relatively large.
In order to add the assumption that increasingly complex
cultural knowledge is more costly to acquire, Eq. 1 can be
modified to make the error parameter a a linear function of the
previous generation’s accumulated skill level zt-1. This error term a
now captures both errors in transmission and the cost of acquiring
previous knowledge, both of which would increase with the
amount of knowledge that must be acquired (represented by zt-1).
The recursion therefore becomes:
Dz~{azt{1zb(ez ln (N)) ð2Þ
where zt-1 gives the accumulated cultural complexity of the
previous generation.
Figure 2. Evidence for increasing cultural acquisition costs. (A) Individual ontogeny recapitulates cultural history for mathematical
knowledge: children learn mathematical concepts in the same order that they were first invented historically. The line is a best-fit logarithmic function
with R2 = 0.97. See Text S1 and Table S1 for sources. (B) Jones’ [19] maximum likelihood functions of the probability of a scientist or inventor
producing a significant scientific or technological innovation (as measured by the awarding of a Nobel prize or entry in prominent technological
almanacs) as a function of the innovator’s age, separately for the years 1900 and 2000. Over this 100-year period the peak age of innovation has
increased by approximately 6 years, and overall innovation rates have decreased. Functions are derived from equation (3) and Table 2 in ref. [19],
recreating that paper’s Figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g002
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Model 2 (Individual-Based Model)
While macroscopic models such as Model 1 are useful first
approximations of the dynamics of cumulative cultural evolution,
such models have several limitations. First, conceptualising
‘‘culture’’ as a single continuous variable (e.g. z) does not reflect
the discrete basis of technological and scientific change. Historians
of science and technology typically view cultural change as the
invention and accumulation of discrete innovations, such as James
Watt’s modification of the existing steam engine by adding a
separate condensation chamber [28], the invention of retractable
landing gear in aircraft [29] or the invention of the mathematical
concepts and techniques shown in Figure 2A [13,14]. While the
net result of these innovations might be a continuous increase in
engine efficiency, aircraft speed etc., at the micro-level this
increase is step-wise and the result of discrete contributions by
specific individuals. Second, and more importantly, macroscopic
models do not typically treat cultural traits as functionally and
historically dependent, where each new innovation is dependent
on a series of previous functionally-linked modifications. James
Watt did not re-invent the steam engine from scratch, he made a
minor modification to the existing Newcomen steam engine;
algebra could only have been invented once the basic number
system was in place, and so on. Indeed, this functional and
historical dependence would seem to be the defining characteristic
of cumulative cultural evolution. The modification made to
Henrich’s [20] model above represents only a crude way of
implementing this dependence.
To investigate these more realistic properties of cumulative
culture, an individual-based model (Model 2) was constructed to
keep track of each individual’s knowledge and each discrete trait in
the population, and explicitly incorporate inter-individual cultural
transmission. Such methods have been used previously to model
the change in distribution of cultural traits such as first names and
pottery designs over time in response to drift-like random copying
and frequency-dependent cultural transmission biases [30,31]. An
individual-based model of cumulative culture by Strimling et al.
[32] represents a valuable first attempt to understand the
microevolutionary basis of this phenomenon, but does not feature
the key assumption of functionally dependent cultural traits that
are costly to acquire, nor does it produce an initial exponential
increase in knowledge.
Model 2 was implemented in C++ (code available from the
author upon request). A population of N individuals (indexed by i,
where i= 1,2,3…N) engage in cultural transmission and innova-
tion for T generations (t= 0,1,2…T). Each individual learns a set
of cultural traits that are functionally sequential, such that earlier
traits must be learned before later traits in the sequence can be
acquired. Each trait is denoted by xs, where x is an integer from 1
to X (in the simulations that follow, X is fixed at 100). These
integers can be seen as different technological modifications or
scientific ideas. The subscript s is an integer (where s= 1,2,3…‘)
indicating the functional level of that trait, with one trait per s-
level. So an individual with x1 = 42, x2 = 71 and x3 = 13 has
acquired three traits, the first labelled 42, the second 71 and the
third 13. The x3 trait cannot be learned unless the x2 trait has
already been learned, which in turn can only be learned by
individuals already knowledgeable of x1.
In order to track cumulative increases in complexity in the
population, each trait xs is assigned a ‘‘trait fitness’’ of zx which
describes that trait’s effectiveness (in the case of technological
inventions) or veracity (in the case of scientific theories). Note that
these are cultural measures of fitness rather than genetic measures;
we are concerned here with changes in cultural traits over time
rather than genes, and it is assumed that cultural traits have no
bearing on survival or reproduction of individuals. The fitness of
each trait within a single s-level is drawn independently from an
exponential distribution as in Rendell et al. [33], such that there
are always a small number of very effective modifications and a
large number of minimally effective or neutral modifications.
Following [33], the values drawn from the exponential distribution
with rate parameter equal to 1 are squared, doubled and rounded
to integers. Roughly half of these values have zero fitness,
representing non-viable attempts at a solution, with a small
number of highly effective traits with fitness around 50. This
assumption of multiple, difficult-to-find solutions that vary in their
effectiveness is likely to apply to many real-life technological or
scientific domains [34].
Trait fitness (zx) is distinguished from ‘‘individual fitness’’, Zi,
which is the sum of the fitnesses of all learned traits known by an
individual i at every s-level up to the highest one learned, smax:
Zi~
Xs~smax
s~1
zs ð3Þ
For example, the three traits listed above, x1, x2 and x3, might
have trait fitnesses of z1 = 24, z2 = 9 and z3 = 48 respectively. The
individual who has learned these three traits (and only these three
traits, such that their smax = 3) therefore has an individual fitness of
Zi = 81. The mean cultural complexity of a population at time t is
denoted Zt and calculated as the mean of all N individuals’ Zi
values, allowing a comparison with the equivalent measure of
mean cultural complexity, zt, used in Model 1.
During each generation the population is replaced with N naive,
unknowledgeable individuals. Note that there is no differential
reproduction of individuals given that we are interested in cultural
rather than genetic change. Each individual has an ‘‘effort budget’’
of l, which represents the total amount of effort that an individual
can devote in their lifetime to learning cultural traits (either
individually or socially), representing the constraint on accumu-
lation introduced in the macroscopic model above. Every
individual of the new generation goes through an initial stage of
copying from the previous generation (i.e. oblique cultural
transmission: [35]). Three alternative copying rules were imple-
mented: directly biased, indirectly biased and unbiased transmis-
sion [8]. For indirect bias, new individuals copy all of the traits
exhibited by the single individual in the previous generation who
has the highest individual fitness, Zi. For direct bias, new
individuals go through each s-level achieved by at least one
member of the previous generation and copy the trait with the
highest trait fitness, zx. Indirect bias involves copying successful
individuals, whereas direct bias involves copying effective traits.
Both are plausible copying rules [8]: copying successful individuals
is a quick and cheap way of acquiring effective behaviour but may
involve the acquisition of some suboptimal traits, whereas direct
bias is more likely to result in the acquisition of the most effective
traits but with greater time and cost (although these costs were not
directly simulated in the present model). This distinction cannot be
easily explored in the macroscopic model of Henrich [20], nor in
Model 1 above, because individuals and traits are not explicitly
tracked. Finally, for unbiased transmission, new individuals copy
all of the traits of a randomly-selected member of the previous
generation. While probably unrealistic with respect to real-life
scientific and technological change, this provides a baseline for
assessing the effectiveness of the two non-random biases.
Copying, whether directly biased, indirectly biased or unbiased,
incurs a cost cs per trait, where cs is measured in effort units. This
Constraints on Cumulative Culture
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cost is fixed for every trait irrespective of the fitness of the trait, so a
trait of fitness z= 50 is just as costly to acquire as a trait of fitness
z= 5. This is a simplifying assumption based on the intuition that
there does not seem to be any systematic correlation between ease
of learning and trait fitness. In some cases suboptimal traits, such
as the base-60 system or Roman numerals, appear to be more
difficult to learn than higher-fitness traits such as the base-10
system or Arabic numerals. In other cases optimal traits, such as
Darwinian evolutionary theory, appear more difficult to learn than
suboptimal traits, such as teleological or Lamarckian evolutionary
theories [36,37]. In the absence of any systematic or empirically
determined correlation, a fixed and fitness-independent cost was
employed.
Copying proceeds until the learner either (i) learns all of the
traits available from the previous generation (either from the most
successful individual in the case of indirect bias, collated across all
individuals in the case of direct bias, or from a randomly selected
individual in the case of unbiased transmission) or (ii) runs out of
effort budget. If the learner has any effort budget remaining after
copying then innovation occurs. During innovation, the learner
randomly selects one of the cultural traits (from 1 to X) at the first
s-level at which no trait has yet been acquired by that individual. If
the trait selected is viable (i.e. its associated fitness is greater than
zero) then the individual successfully learns that trait, otherwise
another trait is chosen at that s-level. The assumption that traits
with fitness of zero are not learned and thus not accumulated is
intended to capture the cumulative aspect of culture, where only
effective traits are built upon.
Innovation, whether successful or unsuccessful, incurs a cost ci
per trait, where ci is measured in effort units. This is again a
simplifying assumption, but is intended to reflect the notion that
inventors/scientists do not possess the foresight to know in
advance which innovations will be most effective [38], and so
may expend effort and time on ultimately fruitless lines of
research. Innovation proceeds for every successive s-level until the
learner runs out of effort budget. It is assumed that the cost of
innovation is higher than the cost of copying (ci.cs), as is standard
in cultural evolution models and reflecting the intuition that it is
easier to learn something from someone else than invent it from
scratch. The first generation undergoes innovation but not
copying.
Finally, in order to explore the positive consequences of
increasing complexity, and in particular to explore the reasons
for exponential growth in cultural complexity discussed above, it is
assumed that both ci and cs may also decrease in proportion to the
mean level of cultural complexity in the population, Zt. The
proportionality constants mi and ms determine the rate at which
these costs decrease. Each individual of generation t therefore has
a modified ci of c

i = (ci - miZt-1) and a modified cs of c

s = (cs - msZt-1),
with the constraints ci$1 and c

s$1 (otherwise learning becomes
costless and accumulation continues to infinity). The assumption
that the cost of innovation, ci, decreases with cultural complexity
reflects the idea that certain innovations, such as new instruments,
methods or techniques, can increase the likelihood of making
further advances. For example, Schummer [16] showed that the
exponential growth in the number of chemical substances created
by chemists over the last 200 years has been driven endogenously in
this manner, such as when a new substance is created using a
particular reaction mechanism and this reaction mechanism is then
applied to other substance classes to create further substances,
rather than as a result of exogenous factors such as an increase in the
number of active chemists (i.e. N in this model) or funding
expenditure. The assumption that the cost of copying, cs, decreases
with cultural complexity is intended to reflect the invention of new
means of communication such as the printing press or the internet
which make it easier to acquire beneficial cultural traits from the
previous generation. This assumption is less empirically-support-
able, and these changes may be more appropriately seen as
exogenous rather than endogenous (e.g. there is no sense in which
the printing press resulted from mathematical knowledge of the 15th
century). However, rather than introducing a novel exogenous
process, this is examined here endogenously in a parallel manner to
the reduction in innovation costs.
Results
Model 1 (Macroscopic Model)
Fig. 3 shows the cultural accumulation over time of the original
Henrich [20] model as well as the modified Model 1 in which
cultural accumulation is constrained by complexity-dependent
acquisition costs. While the original model exhibits a linear
increase in cultural complexity continuing to infinity, the modified
model reaches a stable equilibrium value of cultural complexity of
zmax. Setting Dz= 0 and rearranging Eq. 1 gives this equilibrium
value as :
zmax~
b
a
(ez ln (N)) ð4Þ
This simple addition to Henrich’s [20] model, one that appears
quite plausible on the logical and empirical grounds discussed
above, predicts that cumulative cultural evolution should reach
some stable upper limit as the knowledge accumulated becomes
too complex to successfully acquire and build upon in each
generation. It does not, however, generate the initial exponential
increase in knowledge shown above to be typical of real-life
cultural change.
Model 2 (Individual-Based Model)
The constraints on learning inherent in the individual-based
Model 2 imposed via the l, ci and cs terms generated upper limits
(denoted Zmax as above) on the amount of cultural complexity that
can be attained (Figure 4), similar to those observed in the
Figure 3. Cultural accumulation over successive generations in
Henrich’s [20] original unconstrained model (Eq. 1) and in the
constrained Model 1 (Eq. 2). Parameters: N= 100, a= 0.2, b=0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g003
Constraints on Cumulative Culture
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e18239
modified macroscopic model above (Figure 3). As shown in
Figure 4, the copying rule affects the magnitude of the maximum
cultural complexity that is attained, with direct bias resulting in
higher Zmax than indirect bias, which in turn results in higher Zmax
than unbiased transmission. This is because direct bias involves the
selection of traits of the highest fitness at every s-level separately,
whereas indirect bias allows suboptimal traits to accumulate when
they are exhibited by individuals who nevertheless have the
highest overall individual fitness. This hitch-hiking effect is
explored further below.
Maximum complexity Zmax also increases with population size,
N (Figure 5A), replicating Henrich’s [20] finding that larger
populations can support greater cultural complexity. More
individuals in the population mean that rare high-fitness cultural
traits are more likely to be discovered during innovation, resulting
in higher complexity. Figure 5B shows, for direct bias, a
logarithmic relationship between N and Zmax until the latter
plateaus at around N= 100 for these parameter values. This
indicates that adding more individuals to the population has the
greatest effect at relatively low values of N. At relatively high
values of N, adding more individuals has little effect because all
high-fitness traits have already been discovered. The point at
which further increases in N have no effect is roughly equal to X,
the number of alternative trait values at each s-level. When N$X
then it is likely that at least one individual will discover the optimal
trait at that level, and further increases in N have little effect. As
X = 100 here, the point at which this occurs in Figure 5B is when
N$100. Figure 5B shows that a similar logarithmic relationship
plus plateau also occurs for indirect bias, but it takes larger
populations (around N= 1000 in this case) to reach the point at
which a further increase in N has no effect on complexity. N has no
effect when transmission is unbiased, because a randomly-selected
member of the previous generation is no more likely to exhibit
traits with high fitness when populations are large compared to
when they are small.
The maximum cultural complexity attainable, Zmax, should also
depend on the relative magnitudes of ci, cs and l, given that lower
costs relative to the total effort budget should allow individuals to
learn more cultural traits. Figure 6 shows the relationships
between Zmax and these three variables, separately for directly,
indirectly and unbiased transmission. To understand these
relationships, we can assume that Zmax correlates with the
maximum number of traits that can be accumulated, smax. It is
shown in Text S2 that
smax~
l{ci
cs
ð5Þ
Equation 5 says that smax, and by extension Zmax, should show a
positive linear relationship with l, a negative linear relationship
with ci and an inverse power relationship with cs. Figure 6A shows
that the first prediction for l is upheld for all three transmission
rules. Figure 6B shows that ci exhibits a negative linear relationship
with Zmax as predicted for direct bias and unbiased, but not for
indirect bias where low values of ci produce lower Zmax than
expected. Figure 6C shows that cs fits the expected inverse power
relationship for all three transmission rules.
The initial increase in Zmax at low values of ci under indirect bias
shown in Figure 6B appears counterintuitive: why does increasing
the cost of innovation initially cause an increase in the maximum
cultural complexity attained? Time-step analyses indicated that
this was because indirectly biased cultural transmission with low
innovation costs allows suboptimal cultural traits to accumulate.
Indirectly biased transmission means that the individual with the
highest mean complexity score is copied by the next generation.
When ci is low then a single individual can discover several traits
during the innovation stage. If this best individual has acquired
several traits at once, then although some of those traits will be of
high complexity (given that the individual has the highest mean
fitness in the population), some may be of low complexity. When
the subsequent generation copies all traits of the best t-1 individual,
this may include several of these low fitness traits. Given that traits
are functionally dependent, earlier low fitness traits cannot be
improved upon once they become accumulated, and thus reduce
the eventual maximum accumulated cultural complexity. As ci
increases, individuals can acquire fewer traits in a their lifetime,
and high fitness individuals are less likely to also have (and
transmit) low-fitness traits. This hitch-hiking effect also explains
why indirect bias results in lower maximum cultural complexity
than direct bias, as shown in Figure 4.
Finally, consider the case where the cost of innovation ci and the
cost of cultural transmission cs both decrease in proportion to the
mean cultural complexity of the previous generation (Zt-1)
according to proportionality constants mi and ms respectively.
When mi and ms are sufficiently large, then cultural complexity can
increase to high values even at normally prohibitively high values
of ci and cs, as shown in Figure 7 for both direct (Figure 7A) and
indirect (Figure 7B) bias (unbiased transmission failed to produce
take-offs). In both cases, cultural complexity shows a gradual initial
increase as the costs of learning slowly fall, before increasing
rapidly and then reaching the constraint imposed by the
requirement that ci$1 and c

s$1. These curves resemble the
logarithmic curve shown in Figure 1B that is argued to represent
real-life technological and scientific accumulation. From Figure 7
it can be seen that mi and ms do not behave in exactly the same
way. First, increasing mi causes cultural complexity to take off
earlier than the same increase in ms. Second, whereas for direct
bias (Figure 7A) the magnitude of mi and ms do not affect the final
maximum complexity Zmax, for indirect bias (Figure 7B) a
Figure 4. Time series of mean cultural complexity over time in
Model 2 indicating that complexity reaches a maximum
equilibrium Zmax. Three alternative copying rules are shown:
unbiased transmission (new individuals copy the cultural traits of a
randomly selected member of the previous generation), indirectly
biased transmission (new individuals copy the cultural traits of the
member of the previous generation who had the highest individual
fitness) and directly biased transmission (new individuals copy the
cultural traits with the highest trait fitnesses across the entire previous
generation). Parameters: N = 100, ci= 10, cs= 5, l= 1000, mi= ms=0; all
results are the average of 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g004
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relatively large mi reduces Zmax, compared to the same increase in
ms. This is because of the aforementioned accumulation of
suboptimal traits that is permitted by indirect bias (see
Figure 6B): if mi is large then ci will decrease quickly, and a single
individual will be able to acquire multiple traits some of which will
be suboptimal.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore a potentially important
constraint on cumulative cultural evolution: the increasing costs of
acquiring increasingly complex accumulated knowledge. It was
suggested that as more, and more complex, knowledge is
accumulated over successive generations, it will become increas-
ingly time-consuming and difficult for each new generation to
successfully acquire this accumulated knowledge. In principal,
there may come a point at which acquisition is so costly that no
time is left for innovation, and accumulation ceases. Evidence was
reviewed from quantitative analyses of the history of science and
technology to support the potential existence of such increasing
acquisition costs: first, the acquisition of accumulated knowledge
by an individual was shown to recapitulate the historical
accumulation of that knowledge, such that later generations have
more to acquire than earlier generations; second, while scientific
and technological knowledge is known to have increased
exponentially over time, certain domains have shown recent
slowdowns in the rate of innovation; and third, the mean age at
which scientists and inventors make significant contributions to
their fields has increased over the last century and this increase can
be directly attributed to a longer training period, supporting the
assumption that acquisition of prior knowledge is becoming
increasingly difficult and time-consuming. Two theoretical models
were then presented that explored the consequences of increasing
cultural acquisition costs on cumulative cultural evolution. Model
1 extended an existing macroscopic model of cumulative cultural
evolution, finding as expected that making acquisition costs
dependent on mean population-wide cultural complexity created
upper limits on the amount of cultural complexity that can be
attained. Model 2 explored this further using individual-based
methods in which discrete traits, individuals and transmission
paths are explicitly simulated. Here, assuming that individuals
have a finite lifetime ‘‘effort budget’’ to devote to either acquiring
prior knowledge or innovating new knowledge again produced
upper limits on the maximum cultural complexity that can be
attained, at which point the entire effort budget is spent acquiring
prior knowledge with none left over for further innovation.
The magnitude of this upper limit was shown in Model 2 to
depend on several parameters, each of which has potential
implications for the study of real-life cumulative cultural evolution.
First, as in previous models [20,22], larger populations supported
higher maximum cultural complexity. However, this only
occurred up to the limit set by the acquisition costs, above which
further increases in population size had no effect (i.e. the plateau in
Figure 5B). This is because lifetime learning capacity is an
individual characteristic, and is (in this model) unaffected by the
number of other individuals in the population. Excessive cultural
acquisition costs may therefore constitute a limiting factor on
cultural complexity operating independently of demographic
constraints. The observation that the number of new patents
issued has exhibited a constant or even declining growth rate
during the latter part of the 20th century despite an exponential
increase in the number of active researchers [18] may constitute
evidence of this independence, and warrants further investigation.
Second, directly biased cultural transmission, where individuals
copy the most effective cultural traits exhibited across the entire
previous generation, allowed higher cultural complexity to
accumulate than indirectly biased cultural transmission, where
individuals copy all of the traits of the single individual from the
previous generation who has the highest total knowledge. This in
turn permitted higher complexity than unbiased transmission,
where individuals copy all of the traits of a single randomly-chosen
individual. In general, while unbiased transmission (i.e. random
copying) might explain changes in the distribution of certain
cultural traits [30], cumulative cultural evolution requires direct or
indirect bias. The disadvantage of indirect bias over direct bias is
that indirect bias allows suboptimal traits to accumulate when
exhibited by the most-knowledgeable individual. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, this was most likely to occur at low innovation
costs (see Figure 6B). This is because low innovation costs allow
individuals to invent several traits in a single lifetime; while the
most knowledgeable individual will have mostly high-fitness traits,
Figure 5. Interaction between population size and cultural complexity in Model 2. (A) Time series of mean cultural complexity over time in
Model 2 at different population sizes, N, under the assumption of direct bias. (B) Relationship between maximum cultural complexity Zmax and N for
direct bias, indirect bias and unbiased transmission, and with N plotted on a logarithmic scale. For direct bias, maximum cultural complexity Zmax
increases logarithmically with N up to N= 100 (line is a logarithmic best-fit with R2 = 0.991 for N#100), after which it plateaus. For indirect bias, a
similar logarithmic increase followed by a plateau occurs to that under direct bias, but the values of Zmax are lower and the plateau occurs at higher
values of N (around N= 1000; line is a logarithmic best-fit with R2 = 0.994 for N#1000). For unbiased transmission, N has no effect on Zmax.
Parameters: ci= 10, cs=5, l= 1000, mi= ms= 0, all results are the average of 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g005
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some may be suboptimal, and under the assumption of indirect
bias these suboptimal traits are copied by subsequent generations
along with the optimal traits. High innovation costs mean that
individuals can only invent a few or a single trait in their lifetimes,
maintaining a closer correlation between trait and individual
fitness. With respect to real-life scientific and technological change,
we might ask whether past or present educational and appren-
ticeship systems better resemble either direct or indirect bias.
Newton’s studies of alchemy or Darwin’s theory of pangenesis
might represent suboptimal traits potentially copied by subsequent
generations via indirect bias due to the overall success of their
progenitors. If the primary mode of cultural transmission was
indirect bias, then we might predict that such suboptimal traits
may have hindered scientific progress more than commonly
assumed, as subsequent generations wasted effort in acquiring
these traits and devoted less time to innovation. It is also possible
that the scientific method contains formal mechanisms (e.g.
anonymous peer review) for avoiding the accumulation of
suboptimal traits via indirect bias. On the other hand, the
awarding of honours (e.g. Nobel prizes) to single individuals may
encourage a prestige-based form of indirect bias. Experimental
laboratory studies of cultural transmission have shown that people
willingly employ indirect bias in preference to individual learning,
and that neutral traits can consequently be copied along with
functional traits when both are exhibited by successful models
[39,40]. Further experiments might test more systematically the
conditions under which people engage in direct and indirect bias
when acquiring knowledge and skills accumulated by previous
(cultural) generations of participants in the lab, such as in response
to the aforementioned innovation costs. Further models and
experiments may also add the assumption that direct bias is
intrinsically more costly than indirect bias, because it requires
surveying the entire population on a trait-by-trait basis rather than
copying the single most-successful individual, or that suboptimal
traits can be returned to by later generations and improved.
Third, maximum cultural complexity increased with lifetime
effort budget, and decreased with increasing costs of both
innovation and cultural acquisition (Figure 6). Although such
quantities are somewhat abstract, recent scientometric analyses
have shown that they may be measured with some degree of
accuracy, such as Jones’ [19] quantification of an individual’s
lifetime innovation potential, and the decrease in this potential
over the last century due to longer training periods (see Figure 2B).
The length of training period, for example, might be seen as
equivalent to cs in Model 2 and measured in time. Further
scientometric studies for different domains and over longer time
periods might yield parameter estimates that can be used to
predict the specific course of future cultural change, and perhaps
even estimate when the upper limits observed in the present model
might be reached.
Finally, adding the assumption that innovation costs and
acquisition costs may both decrease with accumulated complexity
generated an initial exponential increase in cultural complexity
(Figure 7) that resembles real-life patterns of scientific and
technological change [17,21]. However, the eventual upper limit
remained due to the assumption that learning always comprises
some cost. The first assumption that innovation costs decrease with
complexity was intended to capture the notion that certain
innovations, such as new techniques or instruments, make further
discoveries more likely. There is evidence from the history of
science that new techniques may increase the likelihood of further
innovation in this way [16]. The second assumption that
acquisition costs also decrease with complexity was intended to
represent innovations such as formal education systems, the
printing press or the internet, that reduce the cost of cultural
acquisition. This assumption is less empirically supportable, and
such phenomena may be more appropriately modelled in the
future as exogenous. Nevertheless, the S-shaped curves shown in
Figure 7 resemble the logistic growth pattern proposed by Price
[12] to describe real-life scientific and technological change
(Figure 1B), and show that such patterns can be obtained from a
Figure 6. The effect on maximum cultural complexity Zmax of
varying (A) lifetime effort budget l (with constant ci=10, cs=5),
(B) innovation cost ci (with constant cs=1, l=100), and (C)
copying cost cs (with constant ci=10, l=100). Circles indicate
direct bias, crosses indicate indirect bias and triangles indicate unbiased
transmission. Lines show best-fit functions, in (A) showing a positive
linear relationship between Zmax and l for direct bias (R
2 = 0.999),
indirect bias (R2 = 0.991) and unbiased transmission (R2 = 0.998); in (B)
showing a negative linear relationship between Zmax and ci for direct
bias (R2 = 0.995) and unbiased transmission (R2 = 0.999), but for indirect
bias only for larger ci values (for ci.30, R
2 = 0.990), with lower ci values
generating lower Zmax values than expected (no best-fit line drawn);
and in (C) showing an inverse power law relationship between Zmax
and cs for direct bias (R
2 = 0.997), indirect bias (R2 = 0.997) and unbiased
transmission (R2 = 0.992). Other parameters: N= 100, X= 100, mi= ms= 0,
all results are the average of 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018239.g006
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set of standard yet minimal assumptions about transmission
dynamics and trait distributions developed by cultural evolution
researchers [8,35]. Further historical studies might test the
additional prediction that innovations which reduce the cost of
further innovation (i.e. mi) will generate faster and earlier
exponential increases in complexity than innovations that reduce
the cost of acquisition (i.e. ms).
A limitation of the present models is their unilinearity, with only
a single sequential lineage of cultural traits. In reality, cultural
evolution is multilinear [41,42], with several concurrent lines of
scientific investigation or technological lineages existing simulta-
neously. Indeed, a major source of innovation is likely to be the
recombination of traits from different lineages [43], which has
been suggested to result in an exponential increase in cultural
complexity [44]. This was demonstrated analytically by Enquist et
al. [21], although that model did not feature the constraints
introduced here. Future models might explicitly simulate multiple
cultural lineages and within-generation, cross-lineage recombina-
tion, in addition to the constraints explored here, in order to
provide a better theoretical foundation for cumulative cultural
evolution and to guide future historical and experimental studies of
this phenomenon.
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